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After several unsuccessful attempts to introduce migration issues into the United Nations agenda, 2006 sees 
them assuming special signiﬁcance, culminat-
ing in the importance they will be granted by 
the UN General Assembly. This trend reﬂects 
the impossibility of evading these issues, which 
have become a key part of development strate-
gies in countries of origin and destination.
Transcending stereotypes
According to the latest UN ﬁgures (UN De-
partment of Economics and Social Affairs, 
Population Division), the total number of in-
ternational migrants has almost doubled in 
20 years (+ 82%). In 2005, around 191 million 
people (including refugees) lived outside their 
country of origin. Fed by Europe in the 1950s, 
migration ﬂows now originate primarily in the 
developing world. China is top of the list of the 
principal migrant-sending countries, with a 
net emigration of 380 000 individuals per year 
for the 1995-2000 period, followed by Mexico, 
countries of the Indian sub-continent (India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey and North Afri-
can countries (Morocco and Algeria). Although 
absent from the list, sub-Saharan African coun-
tries are not to be outdone: ﬂows of migrants 
from West or East Africa in relation to their de-
mographic weight place them among the areas 
with the highest net emigration rates1.
Although these ﬁgures are high in absolute 
terms, they are low in proportion: less than 3% 
of the world’s population. Moreover, the high-
est net emigration rates observed are far lower 
than those seen in certain European countries, 
such as Ireland and Italy, during the great 
waves of transatlantic migration in the 19th 
century. From the point of view of departure 
regions, the image of the mass movement of 
people is therefore inaccurate, although mi-
gratory pressure is growing for some of these 
regions. Around a third of migrants have left 
one developing country for another, and a fur-
ther third for a developed country. Within the 
latter group, nationals of Latin American and 
Caribbean States and those from the south-
ern or eastern Mediterranean basin are in the 
majority. These regions, which are richer and 
closer to developed countries in geographical 
and historical terms, send a larger proportion 
of their population to developed countries than 
African or Asian countries, suggesting there is 
no decisive relationship between emigration 
and poverty.
Largely due to inequalities between coun-
tries or regions, the persistence of population 
movements raises the question of their impact 
on development. Does contemporary migra-
tion contribute to the economic development 
of source countries, as with European migra-
tion to the United States in the late 19th cen-
tury, which helped to bring per capita income 
and real wage rates in line? How can the net 
proﬁts developing countries could gain from 
migration ﬂows be increased?
Contrasting impacts2
Migration has manifold and sometimes con-
tradictory effects on source countries. On the 
one hand, emigration may help to reduce ten-
sion on the country of origin’s labor market and 
give rise to wide-ranging ﬁnancial transfers. On 
the other hand, by favoring skilled workers, it 
may lead to brain drain, thus slowing down de-
velopment, and make countries dependent on 
the funds they receive from their migrants.
Brain drain or brain gain?
According to most research, the exodus of 
skilled workers has a negative impact on source 
countries: lower production potential and a 
loss of investment in training. However, recent 
theoretical studies suggest that emigration 
may stimulate education in source countries. 
Border opening and the prospect of migrating 
may incite individuals to seek training; but as 
only some of them will be able to emigrate, 
the countries concerned will beneﬁt from this 
skilled workforce. Brain drain may thus prove 
beneﬁcial when the brain effect outweighs the 
drain effect. Other contributions highlight the 
driving role of a skilled diaspora in developing 
trade and technology transfer.
In practice, the impact depends on not only 
the scale of the brain drain, but also the source 
country’s characteristics (especially its popula-
tion size) and training methods – if the migrant 
has studied partly in a developed country, the 
ﬁnancial loss is less signiﬁcant for the country 
of origin.
The large Asian countries, where relatively 
few skilled workers emigrate (2.6% for India 
and 3.4% for China), come out on top, unlike 
Central American or Caribbean States, most 
sub-Saharan African countries and North Af-
rica. In certain English-speaking African coun-
tries (Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Kenya) 
and Portuguese-speaking counties (Mozam-
bique and Guinea Bissau), almost a third, if not 
half of all skilled workers leave, which often 
leads to worrying shortages of workers in key 
sectors such as health and engineering.
Despite being criticized by the countries 
concerned, the high mobility of skilled work-
ers is expected to continue or even increase in 
the years to come. In fact, the striking shortage 
of employment prospects often seen in source 
countries teamed with selective immigration 
policies in most receiving countries is expected 
to motivate a growing number of higher edu-
cation graduates from low-income regions to 
leave3. This trend has already begun: during 
the 1990s, the proportion of higher education 
graduates among international migrants living 
in OECD countries rose from 29.8% to 34.6%.
Migration policies fail to take into account 
these observations and uncertainties. Inciting 
migrants to remain in their countries, as pro-
posed by certain developed countries, makes 
very little sense if there are no employment 
prospects. However, it is not desirable to per-
manently deprive countries of origin of their 
most highly skilled workers: studies show that 
these migrants, whose knowledge is neverthe-
less precious, rarely return to their country of 
origin.
Between return policies and selective immi-
gration, there is another possibility: promoting 
the movement of persons by authorizing re-
turn journeys between countries of origin and 
destination, or by granting dual nationality. 
This would simplify the follow-up of co-devel-
opment projects (see below), knowledge trans-
fer and migrant training initiatives, including 
in the receiving country, and would make it 
easier to meet labor requirements in countries 
of origin and destination. By jointly organizing 
Promoting the movement of persons  
by authorizing return journeys between 
countries of origin and destination,  
or by granting dual nationality. 
Iddri | Synthèses n° 03/06 | International migration and development: a watershed? F. Gubert, T. Giordano
such movement, both countries would beneﬁt. 
These policies must be given closer attention.
Remittances: productive capital 
or unearned income?
Currency sent by migrants to their country 
of origin has been regularly and rapidly in-
creasing for the last 15 years. Standing at 160 
billion dollars in 20044, it represents the second 
source of external funding for all developing 
countries, almost on a par with direct foreign 
investment ﬂows (166 billion) and far ahead 
of ofﬁcial development assistance (79 billion). 
Regional distribution is not consistent. Latin 
America receives almost a third of remittances 
transferred by ofﬁcial or legal channels, fol-
lowed by South Asia (India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, etc.), East Asia and the Paciﬁc: as a 
percentage of gross domestic product, South 
Asia holds ﬁrst place.
The distribution of remittances also varies 
between countries according to their income 
level: low, middle or high. Lower middle-in-
come countries receive the most. However, the 
relative weight is far more signiﬁcant in low-
income countries: most sub-Saharan African 
and South Asian countries, some East Asian 
countries (including China) and certain Eu-
ropean and Central Asian countries. In 2002, 
migrant remittances represented over 12% of 
imports for low-income countries and almost 
3% of their GDP.
The scale of these ﬁnancial ﬂows means they 
may have a considerable impact on the balance 
of payments and help to reduce the domestic 
savings deﬁcit. In Egypt in the 1990s, for exam-
ple, remittances represented on average 32% 
of revenue from exports of goods and services 
and almost 24% of imports. Although they help 
to ﬁnance imports and investment, remittances 
increase dependency and therefore vulnerabil-
ity: they may encourage spending on import 
goods to the detriment of local production and 
have no multiplier effect on the economy; they 
may also cause inﬂation and consequently an 
increase in the real exchange rate, particularly 
in countries where the production system is 
relatively inﬂexible.
The lack of reliable data makes any quantita-
tive assessment of the impact remittances have 
on countries dangerous. Economists from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund recently attempted such an assessment 
using macroeconomic data. According to the 
former, migration and remittances have a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant effect on poverty reduction 
in developing countries: a 10 % increase in the 
number of international migrants results in a 
1.9% reduction in the number of people living 
on less than one dollar per day5. According to 
the latter, remittances are compensatory in na-
ture and do not therefore constitute productive 
capital capable of encouraging economic de-
velopment in the country of origin6. Moreover, 
the authors do not rule out the possibility that 
the safety net provided by remittances may en-
courage ‘rentier’ behavior in families receiving 
the money. This hypothesis is conﬁrmed in the 
Kayes region of Mali: despite having more cap-
ital and work, family farms that receive remit-
tances obtain signiﬁcantly lower agricultural 
output than those that do not, while this result 
cannot be attributed to the quality of the land 
or crop techniques, etc.
While the results of changes caused by mi-
gration and remittances remain mitigated at 
the country level, they are beneﬁcial in certain 
migrant-sending regions. For example, in west-
central Mexico, which receives almost a third of 
remittances from the United States, migrants’ 
associations (clubes) launch and ﬁnance many 
different projects covering all aspects of social 
life in their community of origin and thus help 
to compensate for the lack of public invest-
ment. Production initiatives – some of which 
are ambitious in nature – are also beginning 
to take shape. A study has thus estimated the 
proportion of remittances (remesas) invested 
in the creation of new activities (especially 
commercial ones) at around 6%. Moreover, for 
every 100 migrants who return to settle in the 
towns of the region, 30 jobs – of which 20 are 
paid – will be created. In Morocco, migrant-
funded village infrastructure (electricity, water 
supply and irrigation, roads, medical centers 
and schools) goes hand in hand with profound 
changes in traditional ways of life and collec-
tive administration. These trends are observed 
in all well-established immigrant communities 
in receiving countries.
From a longer-term perspective, remittances 
can also have a signiﬁcant impact on health 
and education, two of the pillars of develop-
ment. By allowing families to pay school fees 
or by protecting them from transitory poverty, 
one of the major reasons for children being 
taken out of school, remittances can encourage 
human capital formation. In the same sense, 
by compensating for the lack of health insur-
ance systems and the dearth of medical infra-
structure, remittances help to improve public 
health and workforce productivity. However, if 
remittances are to contribute to development, a 
growing proportion must be transformed into 
productive investment. Possessing knowledge 
about both their country of origin and their 
host country, migrants are in a position to 
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launch and sustain projects. Backers have not 
been mistaken in providing their support for 
numerous initiatives.
However, the success of these co-develop-
ment initiatives implies satisfying a number 
of conditions: the training and heavy involve-
ment of migrants, the dynamism of regions of 
origin, ﬁnancing possibilities, etc. These are 
just some of the difﬁculties involved in large-
scale development. It is therefore important to 
look beyond ﬁnancial remittances and co-de-
velopment in order to strengthen the positive 
impact of migration in source countries.
Towards a global approach?
The 2006 United Nations General Assembly 
will be only one stage, but an important one. 
The fact that migration appears on the agenda 
shows that this issue can no longer be dealt 
with from the viewpoint of host countries’ 
national policies. Globalization has facilitated 
the movement of goods and capital by framing 
this movement with rules negotiated between 
countries. The regulation of both the capital 
and goods markets has become a global issue 
requiring coordinated action between many 
countries and economic operators. The lib-
eralization of services, the next focus for the 
WTO, and pressure from migrants themselves 
are currently making it necessary to consider 
the movement of workers and migration ﬂows 
as a global issue. This change cannot be taken 
for granted. There is heated debate between 
developed countries, which have deﬁned their 
migration policies without taking into account 
their impact on countries of origin, and these 
countries themselves. The debate focuses on 
responsibility and control of ﬂows, as well as 
on the transfer of wealth between countries of 
origin, which have assumed training costs, and 
host countries. In fact, the positive and nega-
tive effects of migration are not fully known, 
meaning political arguments dominate the de-
bate and produce short-term responses that are 
often erratic and contradictory.
This politicization of migration management 
does not help to avoid either growing tension 
or human disasters. The debate taking shape 
is positive, but remains too limited. Empha-
sis placed on the migration of skilled workers 
and migrants’ remittances means the differ-
ent issues relating to migration ﬂows cannot 
be understood as a whole. A more global ap-
proach is needed. Knowledge of demographic 
changes and workforce requirements is vital 
when deﬁning a migration policy centered 
on development. For example, the ageing Eu-
ropean population creates low-skilled jobs, 
which migrants could help to ﬁll. Above all, it 
is important to move towards jointly managing 
migration ﬂows with the authorities in source 
countries from a win-win perspective. Devel-
oped countries must act, but not alone: a dia-
logue on ways to manage growing tension and 
create mechanisms for minimizing, or even 
compensating for losses, is essential. It is clear 
that ofﬁcial development assistance cannot be 
the fundamental tool accompanying migration 
policies in developed countries. o
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